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Book Review
AMMUCAN CONFLICTS LAW. By Robert A. Leflar. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1968.
Pp. 643. $19.50.
Some years ago Professor Leflar set out to collect Arkansas annotations to the
first Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Not satisfied with that project, he produced,
in 1938, Arkansas Law of Conflict of Laws, a treatise based on the law of a single
state. Since no one state can provide enough law on the subject, Professor Leflar
offered in 1959 a revision of the earlier work, The Law of Conflict of Laws. Al-
though the new book provided all the Arkansas cases up to January 1, 1969, they
were treated as illustrations of the subject as found in the law of one jurisdiction.
The larger purpose of that rewriting as announced in the preface was "to give a
fair picture of the American law as it typically operates in any one of the states
today." Although some reviewers found too much Arkansas law in the book, the
most widely expressed criticism was that the author was too content to present the
doctrines of case law with not enough criticism of the philosophical bases pur-
portedly supporting the doctrines or reflection upon the way in which decisions
functioned as opposed to the way in which they were thought to function. In short,
it was a very good job of telling it the way most people thought it was, but not
enough was conveyed of how it ought to be. But that had to be conceded to be
more a fault of the subject than of the reporting.
This new edition, American Conflicts Law, in an attractive volume with an
improved format, goes some way to meet the earlier reviewers. Arkansas cases have
been retained in some measure but more to illustrate matters not found so easily
in the law of other states than to give a continuing point of reference. The di-
versity in choice of law in Arkansas contracts cases, for example, is still instructive.
There is more in the way of criticism and suggestion of trends than before,
but the approach, on the surface at least, is one of cautious transition. Professor
Leflar keeps admirable pace with his subject, careful to explain it and to point up
its obvious faults, careful also not to outrun it. He states his aims in the preface.
The title of this book abandons the traditional term Conflict of Laws,
and uses the vernacular "Conflicts." The new title is intended to be char-
acteristic of the book, representing a mild break with the, past, a recogni-
tion that the law requires both new language and new analysis if it is to
be described, or explained in realistic fashion.
As such the book will be especially welcomed by students and practitioners as
a timely and reliable account of the way in which "Conflicts" has changed and
is changing. No doubt some conflicts scholars will continue to miss the imposition
of an analytical system upon the subject. Readers may occasionally be frustrated
-tantalized is perhaps a better word-by understated but perceptive observations
which only hint at more provocative analyses.
For example, jurisdiction and choice of law traditionally have represented
separate, generally unrelated issues. Professor Leflar observes appropriately that
the assumption of jurisdiction, based as it is more and more on the full exercise
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of authority to adjudicate as permitted by the outer limits of the Due Process
Clause, may be influenced by choice of law. Thus the law to be applied may be
a function of "fairness and substantial justice." This sets one to thinking, and the
author leaves the reader to do most of his own thinking.
The organization of the book is traditional enough. There are preliminary
chapters on theory and domicile and then the usual sequence of judicial jurisdic-
tion, recognition of judgments, and choice of law as developed in the several
subject matter categories. Between judicial jurisdiction and judgments there are
two chapters dealing with conflicts in the federal system, particularly choice of
law. One wishes there were more on federal-state relationships.
If criticism is to be made of the organization it is that the traditional sequence
puts judgments, where change has been slow, between jurisdiction and choice of
law, where change has been rapid. This encumbers analysis of the functional in-
terplay between the dynamic aspects of the subject. The traditional breakdown
of choice of law into domestic subject matter categories, which occupies more than
half of the book, probably prevents a fully functional analysis. After taking the
reader through the choice of law theories and his preferred method of dealing
with choice-influencing considerations-these discussions and the analysis of long
arm jurisdiction by themselves make the book a wise purchase-the author gives
a handbook treatment of choice of law in the several subjects. The term handbook
is perhaps harsh, for the account of existing solutions is accurate and thorough.
There are also constant reminders that the matter might better be handled by re-
sort to analysis of the choice-influencing considerations: (1) predictability of re-
sults; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification of
the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests; (5) ap-
plication of the better rule of law. These considerations may be of varying influence
in torts, contracts and other areas, but their meaning and function are derived
from the common law practice of rational adjudication which transcends the
subject matter.
It is one of the larger ideas of the treatise that we are indeed engaged in
common law decision-making. This obvious truth has too long been obscured.
Now if choice-influencing considerations are to generate rational solutions to
choice of law problems, courts may someday subsume issues within the subject
matter categories under appropriate correlations of the choice-influencing consid-
erations rather than the other way around. Presently there is a troublesome division
between a doctrinal sorting out of choice of law rules and the considerations re-
vealed by functional analysis which in part at least call for organization unfettered
by subject matter boundaries. But the presentation of multi-dimensional problems
in a necessary sequence of page and print requires some organization and Pro-
fessor Leflar has chosen the one which conforms to current practice. In this regard
it is difficult to question his decision. Professor Leflar's hope that American Con-
flicts Law "reasonably reflects . . . new developments" is well realized.
ROBFRT L. FELiX*
*Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law.
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